Abstract. For product sales under a dual channel(DC) comprising a retail channel(RC) and a direct online channel(DOC), it is necessary to consider customers' purchasing behaviors and preferences. This paper proposes the optimal sales strategy for DC under the situation where customer purchasing preference is unknown. This paper discusses three types of customers: (i) customers who prefer purchasing a single type of products in RC, (ii) customers who prefer purchasing them in DOC, (iii) indecisive customers who purchase in either RC or DOC. A retailer runs RC and determines the optimal retail price. A manufacturer runs DOC and determines the optimal direct online price. This paper assumes that each channel faces price-dependent demand. Two sales strategies are compared: the cooperated sales strategy(COSS) and the competed sales strategy(CMSS). Under COSS, a retailer and a manufacturer determine their prices cooperatively. Under CMSS, they determine their prices competitively. Using numerical examples, how (i) the uncertainty in customer purchasing preference, (ii) the existence ratio of indecisive customers, (iii) the sensitivity of demand by the difference between the retail price and the direct online price and (iv) the decrease ratio of the product demand for the increase in price, affect the optimal decisions under COSS and CMSS.
INTRODUCTION
E-commerce has become widespread and made rapid progress because of the commercialization of the Internet, the expansion of sales network . Under this situation, direct online sales where manufacturers sell products directly to customers through online channels have been increasing rapidly. As the sales method of products, a dual channel (DC) comprising a retail channel (RC) run by a retailer and a direct online channel (DOC) run by a manufacturer has become popular (Cai et al., 2009; Khouja et al., 2010; Xu et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2012) . It is necessary for agents in DC to consider customer purchasing preference for products sales to operate DC profitably (Khouja et al., 2010) .
Regarding this problem, Khouja et al. (2010) assumed two types of customers: customers who preferred purchasing products through RC and customers who preferred purchasing them through DOC. However, as for customer purchasing preference, Khouja et al. (2010) did not discuss the existence ratio of indecisive customers who purchase the products in either RC or DOC in their analysis modeling. They also didn't incorporate bias for customer purchasing preference into analysis modeling regarding DC. Differently from previous studies mentioned above, this paper incorporates (i) the existence ratio of indecisive customers and (ii) cooperation and competition between agents in DC into the optimal sales strategy. For product sales under DC comprising RC and DOC, it is necessary to consider customers' purchasing behaviors and preferences. This paper proposes the optimal sales strategy for a DC under the situation where customer purchasing preference is unknown. This paper discusses three types of customers: (i) customers who prefer purchasing a single type of products in RC, (ii) customers who prefer purchasing them in DOC, (iii) indecisive customers who purchase in either RC or DOC. A retailer runs a RC and determines the optimal retail price. A manufacturer runs a DOC and determines the optimal direct online price. This paper assumes that each channel faces price-dependent demand. Two sales strategies are compared: the cooperated sales strategy (COSS) and the competed sales strategy (CMSS). Under COSS, a retailer and a manufacturer determine their prices cooperatively. Under CMSS, they determine their prices competitively. Using numerical examples, how (i) the uncertainty in customer purchasing preference, (ii) the existence ratio of indecisive customers, (iii) the sensitivity of demand by the difference between the retail price and the direct online price and (iv) the decrease ratio of the product demand for the increase in price, affect the optimal decisions under COSS and CMSS. The contribution of this paper provides managerial insights regarding the optimal sales strategies in DC considering (i) the existence ratio of indecisive customers and (ii) cooperation and competition between agents in DC by theoretical analysis.
MODEL DESCRIPTIONS

Operational Flows of a Dual Channel (DC)
(1) A manufacturer produces a single type of products with production cost c per product and sells them to a retailer with wholesale price w per product. (2) The manufacturer sells the same products to customers with direct online price 
Model Assumptions
(1) The customer purchasing preference x follows a probability distribution. The probability density function of x is   fx.The closer to 0 x is, the higher customer purchasing preference through the DOC is. Also, the closer to 1 x is, the higher customer purchasing preference through the RC is.
(2) Using index t of the existence ratio of indecisive customers and the standard deviation  of x , the indecisiveness of customers is expressed as t . Therefore, customers with purchasing preferences through DOC are distributed in 0 0.5 xt     and indecisive customers, who purchase in either RC or DOC, are distributed in 0.5 0.5 t x t       , and customers with purchasing preferences through RC are distributed in 0.5 1 tx     . In this case, the expected ratio of customers d E with purchasing preferences through the DOC, the expected ratio of indecisive customers Y , and the expected ratio of customers r E with purchasing preferences through the RC are calculated as
From Eqs. (1)- (3), demands in both RC and DOC are affected by the probability distribution regarding customer purchasing preference. 
MODEL FORMULATIONS IN DC
Demands of the Products in RC and DOC
Formulations of the product demands in RC and DOC are discussed. Denote A as market volume (potential demand) of the products, 
Here, r D in Eq. (4) is obtained as the sum of the product demand in RC not influenced by 
the Expected Profits of a Retailer and a Manufacturer
First, the expected profit of a retailer is discussed. From subsection 3.1, the expected profit of the retailer   
Next, the expected profit of a manufacturer is discussed. From subsection 3.1, the expected profit of the manufacturer  
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for Pr and Pd is calculated as
.. (7) 4. OPTIMAL SALES STRATEGY IN DC
Optimal Price Decisions under COSS
Under COSS, a retailer and a manufacturer cooperatively determine the optimal retail price and optimal direct online price by the following decision procedures.
[
Step 1] The first-second order partial differential equations of the retailer's expected profit in Eq. (6) Similarly, those of the manufacturer's expected profit in Eq. (7) in terms of
. Here, it is verified that Eqs. (9) and (11) 
Similarly, the tentative direct online price
Step 3] The optimal retail price * COSS r P and the optimal direct online price * COSS d P are determined as solutions of simultaneous equations in Eqs. (12) and (13) as 
Optimal Price Decisions under CMSS
Under CMSS, a retailer and a manufacturer competitively determine the optimal retail price and the optimal direct online price. this paper adopts the decisionmaking approach in Stackelberg game (Cachon, G.P. and Netessine, S., 2004) . In the Stackelberg game, the leader of the decision-making determines the own price optimally so as to maximize the own expected profit. The follower of the decision-making determines the own price optimally so as to maximize the own expected profit under the optimal price determined by the leader. This paper discusses two types of CMSSs: CMSS 1: a retailer is the leader and a manufacturer is the follower and CMSS 2: a manufacturer is the leader and a retailer is the follower.
Optimal Price Decisions under CMSS 1
The decision procedures under CMSS 1 is shown below. 
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Here , 
Step 3] The manufacturer determines the optimal direct online price in CMSS 1 
Optimal Price Decisions under CMSS 2
The decision procedures under CMSS 2 is shown below. 
NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The numerical analysis illustrates the results of the optimal decisions under the strategies, COSS and CMSS. The expected profits of a retailer and a manufacturer under COSS are compared with those under CMSS. In addition, the analysis clarifies numerically how (i) the uncertainty in customer purchasing preference, (ii) the existence ratio of indecisive customers, (iii) the sensitivity of demand by the difference between the retail price and the direct online Customer's purchasing preference x is modeled by using the beta distribution with shape parameter m and scale parameter n . The probability density function
where ()  denotes the gamma function. In numerical examples, the following six cases of the combination of   Figure 1 indicates that the closer to 0 x is, the higher customer purchasing preference through the DOC is, meanwhile, the closer to 1 x is, the higher customer purchasing preference through the RC is.
By substituting numerical examples into Eqs. (1), (2) Tables 1  ~ 4 below, the loss of demand in the whole system means the sum of the loss of demand in RC and that in DOC. Table 1 shows the effect of customer purchasing preference on the optimal price decisions under COSS, CMSS 1 and CMSS 2 and the expected profits in DC.
Effect of Uncertainty in Customer purchasing preference on the Optimal Price Decisions under Each Sales Strategy and the Expected Profits
From Table 1 , the following results can be seen: The optimal direct online price under COSS, CMSS 1 and CMSS 2 are the highest in Case 1 which has very higher customer purchasing preference through DOC. This leads to results that the expected profits in DOC under COSS, CMSS 1 and CMSS 2 are the highest in Case 1. In addition, the difference between the optimal retail price and the optimal direct online price in COSS becomes smaller, as the distribution of customer purchasing preference changes from Case 1 through Case 2 to Case 4. This is because the smaller the bias of the distribution of customer purchasing preference is, not only the more the expected ratio of indecisive customers are, but also the more intensified price competition between a retailer and a manufacturer is.
Comparison of Benefits of Optimal Price Decisions under Each Sales Strategy
Benefits of the optimal price decisions under COSS, CMSS 1 and CMSS 2 are compared. (CMSS where the own agent is the leader of the decision-making) > (COSS) > (CMSS where the own agent is the follower of the decision-making). Therefore, CMSS is the most beneficial sales strategy for a retailer and a manufacturer in the situation where they can determine which agent is the leader of the decision-making. In contrast, COSS is the most profitable sales strategy for a retailer and a manufacturer in the situation where they cannot determine which agent is the leader of the decisionmaking. Table 2 shows the effect of the index t of the existence ratio of indecisive customers on the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in DC under each sales strategy. Here, Case 4 of the distribution of customer purchasing preference is adopted. From Table 2 , the following results can be seen:  The higher t is, the lower the optimal retail price and the optimal direct online price are. This is because the higher t is, the higher the expected ratio of indecisive customers, Y , is and then the increase in Y leads to the situation where price competition between the optimal retail price determined by a retailer and the optimal direct online price determined by a manufacturer is more intensified. From the results on the optimal price decisions, the higher t is, the lower the loss of demand in the whole system is.  Regardless of t , the magnitude relation between the expected profits of the retailer and the manufacturer under each sales strategy is the same as that in 5.2. Table 3 shows the effect of the sensitivity in price difference on the optimal price decisions and the expected profits in DC under each sales strategy. Here, Case 4 of the distribution of customer purchasing preference is adopted. From Table 3 , the following results can be seen:  The higher is, the lower the optimal retail price and the optimal direct online price are. This is because the increase in leads to the situation where price competition between the optimal retail price determined by a retailer and the optimal direct online price determined by a manufacturer is more intensified. From the results on the optimal price decisions, the higher is, the lower the loss of demand in the whole system is.  Regardless of , the magnitude relation between the expected profits of the retailer and the manufacturer under each sales strategy is same as that in 5.2.
Effect of Existence Ratio of Indecisive Customers on the Optimal Price Decision under Each Sales Strategy and the Expected Profits
Effect of Sensitivity in Price Difference on the Optimal Price Decisions under Each Sales Strategy and the Expected Profits
Effect of Decrease Ratio m on the Optimal Price Decisions under Each Sales Strategy and the Expected Profits
